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In recent years, Europe’s highest courts have searched for the answer to the problem of 
intermediary liability in the notion of a ‘fair balance’ between competing fundamental rights. 
At the same time, the ‘notice-and-takedown’ system, which first emerged as a solution to 
intermediary liability in the 90s, has spread across the globe, transforming along the way into 
an assortment of ‘notice-and-action’ variants that differ from country to country. In this article, 
we seek to examine how both these approaches to the intermediary liability question can be 
usefully combined. Interpreting ‘fair balance’ as a call for compromise, we propose a move 
away from the traditional ‘horizontal’ approach of the EU’s safe harbour regime, towards a 
more ‘vertical’ scheme, whereby distinct ‘actions’ are tailored to diverse wrong-doings: 
notice-and-notice for copyright, notice-wait-and-takedown for defamation and notice-and-
takedown and notice-and-suspension for hate speech. Notice-and-judicial-take-down can 
function as a complementary all-purpose solution. Automatic takedown and notice-and-stay-
down are applicable exclusively to child pornography. We suggest that the resulting calibrated 
system can contribute to achieving a truer ‘fair balance’ in this difficult area of law. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
In Europe, the liability of hosting intermediaries – i.e. of such platforms as YouTube, Twitter 
or Facebook3 – for the unlawful activities of their users is increasingly approached as a matter 
of fundamental rights law. Though at first sight somewhat counter-intuitive, upon closer 
examination this development is unsurprising. Intermediary liability is a cross-border problem 
that deserves a uniform European solution. Yet, the secondary law of the EU directives has so 
far only offered incomplete answers. In the absence of more concrete guidance, fundamental 
rights have emerged as the only existing means of binding different European jurisdictions to 
common interpretations. As a result, Europe’s highest courts – the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – have re-construed 
the traditional tort and criminal law question of accessory liability for the acts of others as a 
question of clashes between fundamental rights. The relationship here is a triadic one: the 
fundamental rights of intermediaries (e.g. freedom of expression and freedom to conduct a 
business) are seen as entangled with the fundamental rights of alleged victims (e.g. copyright, 
right to reputation, freedom from discrimination and freedom from sexual abuse), as well as 
those of internet users (e.g. freedom of expression and right to privacy).  
 
How should such clashes be resolved? The CJEU and ECtHR have answered this question by 
resorting to the doctrine of ‘fair balance’.4 At the same time, the EU legislator has also begun 
inching towards improved harmonisation. Crucially, the European Commission has recently 
indicated that it ‘will review the need for formal notice-and-action procedures’ as an answer to 
intermediary liability for infringing activities by internet users.5 Under notice-and-action, once 
notified of allegedly unlawful content, intermediaries need to respond with the appropriate 
‘action’. In this article, we seek to examine how both avenues – the judicial search for a ‘fair 
balance’ and the legislative emphasis on ‘notice-and-action’ – can be usefully combined. To 
this end, we interpret the courts’ search for a ‘fair balance’ in terms of a quest for a compromise 
solution, i.e. one that allows all parties to the fundamental rights clash to share a partial 
responsibility, so that none is made to carry the sole – or an excessive – burden. To 
operationalise this idea in the area of intermediary liability, we then turn our attention to notice-
and-action systems.  
 
The proposal we develop throughout this article can be contrasted with the traditional ‘notice-
and-takedown’ solution of current EU legislation, as contained in the E-Commerce Directive. 
Current EU legislation limits the ‘action’ expected of the intermediary to only one possibility 
- ‘takedown’ - which applies ‘horizontally’, i.e. to all areas of law in which intermediary 
liability arises as a potential issue. What we propose instead is a ‘vertical’ response, whereby 
distinct actions are tailored to diverse wrong-doings: notice-and-notice for copyright 
infringement, notice-wait-and-takedown for defamation, and notice-and-takedown and notice-
and-suspension for hate speech. Notice-and-judicial-take-down provides an alternative that 
should be available in all cases. Operating at the edges of the balanced system, automatic 
takedown and notice-and-stay-down obligations are suggested for child pornography.  
 
                                                          
3 Hosting intermediaries would include, according to our understanding, both the traditional providers of disk-
space and processors on a server and modern web 2.0 interactive operators. All subsequent references to 
intermediaries should be understood to refer to hosting intermediaries, insofar as our substantive arguments are 
concerned (descriptive references in the discussion of the case law may include a broader range of intermediaries). 
4 See case law overview in II.B. - The Courts Step in: the CJEU, the ECtHR and ‘Fair Balance’. 
5 European Commission, Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288/2, 25 May 2016, 9. 
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Our proposal is intended to shift the debate away from unhelpful ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions 
towards more fruitful tailored approaches. We particularly aim to show how a calibrated notice-
and-action system may contribute towards achieving a truer ‘fair balance’ for intermediary 
liability. For this purpose, we invite legislators (in the first place the EU legislator), courts (in 
the first place the CJEU and the ECtHR) and scholars alike to explore different avenues in 
resolving the intermediary liability conundrum.  
 
II.  Intermediary Liability: in Search of a Fair Balance 
 
A.  The EU Legal Framework: Lack of Concrete Guidance 
 
What is the current EU framework governing the liability of intermediaries that host third party 
content for illegal activity committed by those third parties? The most important EU provision 
is found in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive (ECD).6 This offers a so-called ‘safe 
harbour’, i.e. a defence against liability, to online hosts, provided certain conditions are met. 
In particular, hosts of third party content are not liable, as long as: 
 
(a) they do not have actual knowledge of the illegality of that content and, as regards claims 
for damages, awareness of facts or circumstances from which the illegality is apparent; 
or 
(b) upon obtaining such knowledge, they act expeditiously to remove or to disable access 
to the content.7 
 
Article 15(1) ECD additionally prohibits the imposition of general obligations on hosts that are 
protected by a safe harbour to monitor the information which they transmit or store, or to 
actively seek out facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.  
 
As the conditions of Article 14 ECD make apparent, the hosting safe harbour relies heavily on 
the now popular concept of ‘notice-and-takedown’: while notice will not necessarily be the 
only way of obtaining actual knowledge or awareness,8 the ban against general monitoring 
obligations of Article 15 ECD will certainly make it the most common one. Admittedly, the E-
Commerce Directive fails to provide a detailed procedure guiding the application of its notice-
and-takedown system. This can be contrasted to, e.g., the situation in the United States, where 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) outlines elaborate rules on notice-and-
                                                          
6 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic 
Commerce) [2000] OJ L 178/1 (hereafter E-Commerce Directive or ECD). 
7 To benefit from the safe harbour, the host must additionally not have had authority or control over the end-user 
in the posting of the contested information (Article 14(2) ECD). A final condition of ‘neutrality’ on the part of the 
provider has subsequently also been added by the case law of the CJEU. See CJEU, joined Cases C-236/08 and 
C-237/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton et al [2010] ECR I-241; CJEU, Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay 
International [2011] ECR I-6011; CJEU, Case C-291/13 Papasavvas [2014] EUECJ C-291/13. In introducing the 
condition of ‘neutrality’, the CJEU relied on the title of Section 4 (‘Liability of intermediary service providers’) 
to hold that any provider seeking to enjoy the protection of the safe harbour must be an ‘intermediary service 
provider’. The Court then rested its interpretation of the term ‘intermediary’ on Recital 42 of the E-Commerce 
Directive, which requires that the activity of the service provider be ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive 
nature’, such that the provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or 
stored’. These requirements the Court finally condensed into the single notion of ‘neutrality’. 
8 In L’Oréal, the CJEU also mentions the possibility of ‘investigations undertaken on the intermediary’s own 
initiative’. See L’Oréal (n 7) para 122. 
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takedown.9 At the same time, the ECD’s current provisions need not necessarily be taken as 
the final European answer on the topic. Article 21 ECD foresees the possibility of a future 
introduction of a complete notice-and-takedown procedure at the European level. 
 
In any case, Article 14 ECD compensates for what it misses in procedural detail through the 
breadth of its reach: like all the ECD safe harbours, the hosting immunity takes a 
comprehensive horizontal approach to intermediary liability. It is intended to function as a 
holistic tool, equally applicable to a diverse array of legal wrongs. These may be derived from 
private law, in the form of e.g. copyright infringement or defamation, as well as from criminal 
law, in the form of e.g. incitement to violence, hate speech or child pornography.10 The 
horizontal approach to intermediary liability rests on the idea that, from a technical perspective, 
hosting activities are the same regardless of the branch of law involved. Accordingly, by 
providing a single set of rules, the EU aims to offer a straightforward solution: comprehensive 
protection to intermediaries that is independent of the specific wrongdoing levelled against 
them.11  
 
But the EU horizontal intermediary liability system should not be taken for granted. Indeed, 
strong arguments speak out against it. For one thing, other jurisdictions do not always endorse 
the horizontal model. For example, the US solution differentiates between intermediary 
liability for intellectual property infringements and other areas of law, setting up different legal 
regimes for each of these two categories.12 In Europe too, the national frameworks that govern 
the liability of intermediaries which are not covered by the safe harbours is as fragmented as 
any other area of law. The few EU-level rules of positive law that do exist also vary  depending 
on subject area. More importantly, whether the horizontal approach continues to be valid in the 
more settled landscape of contemporary information society is open to discussion. In the early 
days of mystification at then  unknown entities, approaching intermediary liability as a 
monolithic special case defined by the service supplied might have offered a sleek way of 
simplifying a complicated debate. As the internet comes of age, however, the idea of internet 
exceptionalism – including internet intermediary exceptionalism – must be questioned and 
greater nuance added to the intermediary liability debate.13  
 
In response to these concerns, a possible diversification of the EU intermediary liability regime 
has recently been tentatively put back on the EU agenda. After dropping numerous hints, the 
European Commission explicit referenced the introduction of a ‘notice-and-action’ mechanism 
in its May 2016 Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’.14 
                                                          
9 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C., adopted 28 October 1998), section 512(c)(1)(C) and 
512(c)(3). 
10 See Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘Online Services, Including E-Commerce, in the Single Market’, 
SEC(2011) 1641 final, 11 January 2012.  
11 Miquel Peguera, ‘The DMCA Safe Harbors and their European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of some 
Common Problems’ (2009) 32 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 481. 
12 So, while section 512 of the DMCA applies to copyright, section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act 
1996 (47 U.S.C.) (also known as the ‘Good Samaritan’ defence) grants total immunity from liability to 
intermediaries in all areas apart from intellectual property law, federal criminal law and communication privacy 
law. See Béatrice Martinet Farano, ‘Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement: 
Reconciling the EU and US Approaches’ (2012) TTLF Working Paper No 14, 23-25. 
13 Jaani Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016; forthcoming). See also 
Ronald J Mann and Seth R Belzley, ‘The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability’ (2005) 47 William and Mary 
Law Review 239. 
14 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’, 
COM(2015) 288/2, 26 May 2015. See also, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
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Arguably, this subtle mutation from ‘takedown’ to the more flexible ‘action’ implies a move 
away from a single-path solution to intermediary liability. Indeed, in its Communication the 
Commission explicitly considers the possibility that ‘different categories of illegal content 
require different policy approaches in respect of notice-and-action procedures’.15 In other 
words, the Commission is contemplating a transition towards a ‘vertical’ approach to 
intermediary liability.16  
 
How could such a transition be pursued? In this article, we aim to move the discussion forward 
by showing what a new, vertical notice-and-action mechanism could look like. The secondary 
EU law of the directives offers precious little insight in this regard. Instead, it is the case law 
on intermediary liability of Europe’s highest courts that indicates how to proceed. It does this 
by focusing not on the directives, but on more basic legal principles: fundamental rights. While 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has approached intermediary liability 
through the lens of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has applied the European Convention on Human Rights to the area. As a result, 
the ‘mundane’ question of intermediary liability has been reinterpreted as a ‘dramatic’ conflict 
between opposing principles at the highest levels of European law.17 As we shall see, the 
fundamental rights approach confirms the need for a more granular solution.  
 
B. The Courts Step in: the CJEU, the ECtHR and ‘Fair Balance’ 
 
1. Balancing Intermediary Liability before the CJEU 
 
The CJEU was the first of Europe’s two highest courts to tackle intermediary liability cases 
using fundamental rights. The relevant case law has been propelled forward by EU law on 
intellectual property rights, particularly copyright.18  
                                                          
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Towards a 
modern, more European copyright framework’, COM(2015) 626 final, 9 December 2015. This also mentions 
‘notice-and-action’, although only in the context of copyright. 
15 Ibid, 7. 
16 The recently released proposal on a new Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) confirms this 
tendency by proposing to diversify the rules that govern video-sharing platforms, so that special regimes apply 
with regard to hate speech and the protection of minors. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in 
view of changing market realities, COM/2016/0287 final - 2016/0151 (COD). While the Commission insists that 
the proposed rules are ‘fully in line with the ecommerce Directive’ (see ‘Revision of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive’, available at: ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/revision-audiovisual-media-services-
directive-avmsd), presumably because they do not go beyond takedown and rely primarily on self-regulatory and 
co-regulatory processes, they nevertheless indicate growing pressures for a shift towards more substantive and 
more calibrated regulation. 
17 It should be noted that whether the term ‘fundamental rights’ or ‘human rights’ is used depends on the relevant 
source: rights derived from international law are termed human rights, while rights derived from domestic national 
constitutional law, as well as from European law are termed fundamental rights. See Patrick Kinsch, ‘Human 
Rights and Fundamental Rights (ChFR and ECHR)’ in Jürgen Basedow et al. (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 839. 
18 This is unsurprising given the more robust EU framework for that area. In particular, the CJEU case law, taking 
advantage of the inapplicability of the safe harbours to injunctive orders (see Article 14(3) of the E-Commerce 
Directive), has to a large extent rested on the provisions in the EU directives imposing obligations on Member 
States to enable the issue of such injunctions against intermediaries for the enforcement of copyright and other 
intellectual property rights, see Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 




The leading CJEU judgement in the area is the 2008 one of Promusicae.19 Here, the CJEU was 
called upon to clarify whether EU law requires that Member States impose a duty on internet 
access providers to retain and communicate the personal data of their users, whose IP addresses 
have been found to have been used to infringe copyright, in order to allow the copyright holders 
to bring proceedings against them. The Court found that in principle no such obligation exists. 
At the same time, in view of the paucity of guidance on this topic in the directives,20 the CJEU 
turned to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union for guidance.21 It 
interpreted the circumstances of the case as an instance of a clash between fundamental rights. 
On this basis, the Court stated that, in transposing the directives and implementing the 
transposing measures, ‘the Member States must […] take care to rely on an interpretation of 
the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights 
protected by the Community legal order’.22  
 
In  subsequent case law, the CJEU has confirmed this ‘fair balance’ approach. As a general 
rule, in cases of intermediary liability the CJEU sets up a tripartite dynamic. This distinguishes 
between the fundamental rights of copyright holders, intermediaries and internet users. For the 
first, (a) the right to intellectual property (Article 17(2) Charter) is at stake, occasionally 
bolstered by (b) the right to effective judicial protection (Article 47 Charter). Depending on the 
particular circumstances of the case, this may collide with (c) the intermediaries’ freedom to 
conduct a business (Article 16 Charter). The rights of end-users to (d) the protection of their 
personal data (Article 8 Charter), (e) their private life (Article 7 Charter) and (f) their freedom 
to receive and impart information (Article 11 Charter) are also taken into account. 
 
This deconstruction has proved productive: while the application of the ‘fair balance’ approach 
in Promusicae yielded no concrete guidance, the rulings that followed have increasingly 
offered useful insights. The trend is firstly evident with L’Oréal v eBay,23 a trademark case and 
the earliest CJEU judgment on injunctions obliging intermediaries to take action against 
infringement. While, as with Promusicae, the L’Oréal ruling gave no instructions on how to 
achieve ‘fair balance’, it did provide two examples of measures that would fit the bill: (a) the 
suspension of the primary perpetrator, so as to prevent future infringements of the same 
trademark by the same user; and (b) measures that make it easier to identify the intermediary’s 
end-users, as long as these persons are operating in the course of trade and not in a private 
matter. 
 
                                                          
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights [2004] OJ L 157/45). 
19 CJEU, Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU [2008] 2 
CMLR 465. 
20 Aside from the E-Commerce, Copyright and Enforcement Directives, the CJEU examined the relevant 
provisions in the E-Privacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L 201/37) and the Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
[1995] OJ L281/31). 
21 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, opened for signature 7 December 2000, [2000] OJ C 
364/01 (entered into force 1 December 2009). 
22 See Promusicae (n 19) para 68. 
23 See L’Oréal (n 7). 
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The subsequent twin Sabam cases, Scarlet24 and Netlog,25 offered more concrete interpretative 
footholds. Both cases concerned injunctive orders, granted in national courts, imposing 
filtering obligations on intermediaries for the purposes of copyright enforcement. While Scarlet 
concerned a mere conduit provider, Netlog involved a host. In both cases, the result was 
identical: the requested filtering system was an exceptionally broad one, which would apply 
for all the intermediary’s customers, in abstracto and as a preventive measure, exclusively at 
the cost of that intermediary and for an unlimited period of time. The CJEU concluded that, in 
view of its expansive nature, the system would impose too complex, costly and permanent 
burdens on the intermediary’s business model. It would also require the systematic analysis of 
the personal data of all users, including non-infringing ones. In addition, it would run the risk, 
given the complicated nature of copyright law, of not distinguishing adequately between lawful 
and unlawful content. As a result, the Court rejected the contested measure as incapable of 
striking a fair balance.  
 
Finally, in UPC Telekabel Wien,26 the CJEU considered the imposition of an injunction 
ordering an internet access provider to block access to copyright infringing content. Moving 
along by now well-trodden paths, the Luxembourg Court held that blocking injunctions 
imposed on an intermediary in the enforcement of copyright strike a fair balance, provided that 
the intermediary is given the right to choose the measure it will apply and is able to avoid 
incurring coercive penalties for breach of the injunction by showing that it has taken all 
reasonable measures. The measures taken must, according to the CJEU: 
 
(i) [...] not unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully 
accessing the information available and (ii) [...] have the effect of preventing 
unauthorised access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it 
difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the 
services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter that 
has been made available to them in breach of the intellectual property right, that 
being a matter for the national authorities and courts to establish.27 
 
Satisfying all these goals simultaneously will obviously require delicate legal navigation. At 
the same time, by introducing a list of conditions in Telekabel, the CJEU has provided some 
tangible guidance on how to achieve the coveted ‘fair balance’. National courts now have at 
least one set of balancing benchmarks, however mutable and dependent on the facts of the 
particular case those might be. 
 
2. Balancing Intermediary Liability before the ECtHR 
 
Where does the ECtHR stand in all this? The Strasbourg court has addressed the question of 
intermediary liability from the ECHR perspective in two recent decisions: Delfi v Estonia28 and 
MTE v Hungary.29 Both cases concerned the liability of online hosts for allegedly defamatory 
content posted by anonymous users in the comment sections below news articles published by 
                                                          
24 CJEU, Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2011] EUECJ C-70/10. 
25 CJEU, Case C-360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog 
NV [2012] 2 CMLR 18. 
26 CJEU, Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] ECDR 12.  
27 Ibid, para 64. 
28 ECtHR, Delfi v Estonia [2015] ECHR 586.  
29 ECtHR, Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v Hungary [2016] ECHR 135 (hereafter 
MTE v Hungary). See also the Chamber judgment in ECtHR, Delfi v Estonia [2013] ECHR 941. 
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the platforms. Like the CJEU, the ECtHR has also applied a fair balance test to reason through 
the issue. This confirms that the doctrine is the correct legal lens through which to view cases 
of intermediary liability. At the same time, intriguing differences divide the relevant ECtHR 
case law from that of the CJEU outlined above.  
 
For one thing, neither Delfi nor MTE concerned the violation of intellectual property rights, the 
particular field of law on which the CJEU case law has focused thus far. This is important as it 
indicates the viability of the balancing approach to intermediary liability generally. In this way, 
the case law of the ECtHR shows that the notion of a fair balance has broad pertinence, 
extending, much as the safe harbours, horizontally across a range of different branches of law. 
 
In addition, both Delfi and MTE involved the liability of intermediaries in the strict sense of 
the word, i.e. not for injunctions, but for monetary compensation. Again, this confirms that fair 
balance is relevant to claims that go beyond the realm to which EU case law has so far confined 
it. Indeed, no EU substantive law currently exists governing liability for damages and the EU 
Charter might therefore not (given that it is only addressed to the Member States when they are 
implementing EU law)30 have effect in that area. But signatories to the Convention are 
nevertheless obliged to achieve a fair balance in their national intermediary liability legislation. 
The rights of all relevant parties should thus always be seen as pertinent to the determination 
of the  appropriate reach of enforcement measures imposed on intermediaries in Europe.  
 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the ECtHR case law brings with it methodological 
advantages. In a marked improvement on the cryptic statements of the Luxembourg court, the 
ECtHR has adopted a much more structured approach to balancing in the area of intermediary 
liability. It has done this by listing, in Delfi, four specific factors to guide the balancing process:  
 
a) the context of the comments;  
b) the measures applied by the platform in order to prevent or remove the comments;  
c) the liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to the platform’s 
liability; and  
d) the consequences of the domestic proceedings for the platform.31  
 
In MTE, the content of the comments was tacked on as an additional consideration under (a), 
while a fifth factor was also added to the mix: (e) the consequences of the comments for the 
victim.32  
 
In applying these factors to the two cases, the ECtHR came to two very different conclusions. 
In Delfi, the Grand Chamber of the Court requalified the contested comments as hate speech 
and incitement to violence. The Court then decided that, in view of the particularly odious 
nature of the comments, the imposition of liability on the hosting provider struck a fair balance. 
It therefore did not entail a violation of the right to freedom of expression. In MTE by contrast, 
the Fourth Section of the Court characterised the impugned comments as merely offensive. The 
Court concluded that the liability imposed on the intermediaries for their dissemination violated 
the right to freedom of expression. While much has been written about the inadequacies of the 
MTE Court’s logic in this regard,33 particularly in view of the unclear differences between the 
                                                          
30 See Article 51 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (n 21).  
31 See Delfi (n 28) para 142. 
32 See MTE (n 29) paras 68-69. 
33 Pieter-Jan Ombelet and Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ‘Delfi Revisited: the MTE-Index.hu v. Hungary Case‘, LSE 
Media Policy Project Blog, 19 February 2016, available at: http://bit.ly/28Oyxxx; Dirk Voorhoof and Eva 
9 
 
user comments in the two cases, it does provide one important revelation: intermediary liability 
in different areas of law may well require different legal solutions.  
 
In conclusion, the case law of Europe’s two highest courts has revealed that the notion of ‘fair 
balance’ is the main guiding light of the emerging European intermediary liability law. 
Although the precise meaning of the ‘fair balance’ doctrine remains unclear, the relevant case 
law does highlight one important characteristic intermediary liability law should display to 
comply with it: a mutable nature. Far from the ‘horizontal’ approach espoused by current 
secondary EU law, the notion of a ‘fair balance’ speaks to the need for flexibility. The 
appropriate solution to intermediary liability should shift with the circumstances. Below, we 
examine exactly how this effect can be achieved.  
 
III.  Fair Balance in Theory: Reaching a Compromise 
 
Before we proceed further, one issue must be clarified: why exactly have the CJEU and the 
ECtHR so confidently embraced fair balance as the solution to intermediary liability? The key 
lies in appreciating that the question of intermediary liability is a quintessential question of 
fundamental rights clashes.34 To tackle such clashes, constitutional and supranational courts 
the world over resort to the notion of balancing.35 Balancing has in this way become the judicial 
tool of preference for the resolution of the kinds of fundamental rights clashes epitomised by 
intermediary liability. It is thus not surprising that Europe’s two highest courts have also 
adopted it.  
 
In their intermediary liability case law, the ECtHR and CJEU have invoked two main reasons 
for this approach. The first can be located in the case law of the Luxembourg court. This 
clarifies that intermediary liability cases do not involve clashes between absolute rights, but 
between rights of relative  weight, i.e. rights that can justifiably be restricted to protect 
countervailing rights or interests. In the Sabam cases, for instance, the CJEU ruled that: 
 
[t]he protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 
17(2) of the Charter [but there is] nothing whatsoever in the wording of that 
provision or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must 
for that reason be absolutely protected ... [Instead,] the fundamental right to 
property, which includes the rights linked to intellectual property, must be balanced 
against the protection of other fundamental rights.36 
 
The ECtHR supplements this argument by insisting that there exists no abstract hierarchy 
between relative human rights. Instead, those rights deserve, the Court declares, ‘equal respect’. 
Since one right cannot automatically ‘trump’ another right, balancing is necessarily the 
appropriate solution. In Delfi, the ECtHR held that the relevant question is one of: 
 
                                                          
Lievens, ‘Offensive Online Comments - New ECtHR Judgment’, ECHR Blog, 15 February 2016, available at: 
http://bit.ly/28LoOGg. 
34 On human rights clashes, see Stijn Smet, Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights: The Judge’s Dilemma 
(Routledge, 2016; forthcoming). 
35 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 68-149; Aharon Barak, Proportionality – Constitutional Rights and their 
Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 185. For a table depicting the consecutive migrations of 
proportionality until its current world-wide popularity, see ibid, 182. 
36 See Scarlet (n 24) paras 43-44. See also Netlog (n 25) paras 41-43. 
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fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may 
come into conflict with each other in certain cases, namely on the one hand freedom 
of expression protected by Article 10, and on the other the right to respect for 
private life enshrined in Article 8 ... [given that] as a matter of principle, the rights 
guaranteed under Articles 8 and 10 deserve equal respect.37 
 
Of course, it is not because the CJEU and the ECtHR have confidently proclaimed balancing 
to be the name of the game that their solution is necessarily convincing. Indeed, balancing is 
not without its  critics. In the constitutional domain, the doctrine has been criticised for being 
‘more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy’,38 for its 
‘emptiness as a methodology’39 and for taking place ‘either arbitrarily or unreflectively’,40 as 
‘inside a black box’.41  
 
Importantly, the balancing case law of the CJEU on intermediary liability has attracted 
particular criticism for its vague – verging on meaningless – wording. As seen above, in 
Promusicae the CJEU merely stated that balancing must be ensured by the Member States.42 
In L’Oréal, the Court refused to even identify the relevant rights.43 In Scarlet and Netlog, the 
Court did achieve a concrete solution, but it also avoided a detailed break-down of its balancing 
reasoning. Instead, it merely listed the effect the conflicting rights would have on each other. 
Telekabel had the reverse problem, refusing to provide a definitive outcome, although it did 
offer some semblance of guidelines. Unsurprisingly, the CJEU has accordingly been accused 
of invoking the notion of fair balance, while failing to explain its meaning. Griffiths, for 
example, laments that the Court’s ‘concept of the "fair balance" is, without further elucidation, 
vacuous and unhelpful’.44 Mylly argues that ‘if the analysis stops there [where Promusicae 
leaves it], "balancing" remains an empty slogan merely giving fundamental rights gloss to the 
CJEU case law’.45 Admittedly, the factor-infused approach of the ECtHR is more rigorous, 
going a long way towards providing structure to an otherwise abstract process. Yet, it is not 
easy to ignore the drastically different outcomes in Delfi and MTE, which belie the similarity 
in the facts in both cases. As a result, deriving clear conclusions from the case law, let alone 
constructing a coherent theoretical framework on its inscrutable basis, is difficult. 
 
Yet, notwithstanding the strong critique that both balancing in general and its specific 
application to intermediary liability has received, we do not foresee either the CJEU or the 
ECtHR back-peddling on its  decision to resort to this doctrine. With this pragmatic thought in 
mind, we note that our aim in this article is not to counter critiques of balancing. Instead, we 
base our analysis on the empirical observation that Europe’s highest courts – the ECtHR and 
the CJEU – both resort to balancing to resolve fundamental rights clashes in intermediary 
                                                          
37 See Delfi (n 28) paras 138-139 and Delfi (n 29) paras 81-82. See also, outside the area of intermediary liability, 
ECtHR, Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) [2012] ECHR 228, para 106; ECtHR, Axel Springer AG v Germany 
[2014] ECHR 1037, para 87. 
38 Concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in United States Supreme Court, Bendix Autolite v Midwesco Enterprises, 
486 U.S. 888 (17 June 1988). 
39 Thomas A Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 983. 
40 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press, 1996) 259. 
41 See Aleinikoff (n 39) 976.  
42 See Promusicae (n 19) para 68. 
43 See L’Oréal (n 7) para 143. 
44 Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or Harmonising? – The Court of Justice, the Right to Property and 
European Copyright Law’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 72. 
45 Tuomas Mylly, ‘The Constitutionalization of the European Legal Order: Impact of Human Rights on Intellectual 
Property in the EU’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property 
(Edward Elgar, 2015) 130. 
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liability cases. Having accepted this, we posit that substance to balancing may be uncovered 
with some digging.  
 
In the remainder of this article, we hope to do just that: shine some light into the ‘black box’ 
of balancing. In particular, we aim to suggest how balancing could be made to work in the area 
of intermediary liability. For this purpose, we will first seek a viable understanding of the 
concept of ‘fair balance’. In pursuing this goal, we will examine the legal theory underpinning 
the notion. If the intermediary liability case law cannot give us a clearer idea of what fair 
balance involves, perhaps a broader consideration of the underlying jurisprudence can. On this 
basis, we will argue in favour of an interpretation of ‘air balance’  as representing a compromise 
between the various fundamental rights at stake. Having laid this theoretical foundation, we 
will then  apply our interpretation of fair balance by proposing a ‘vertical’ notice-and-action 
system, whereby distinct actions are tailored to fit different infringement claims.  
 
A. Fair Balance as Compromise 
 
In the previous sections we established that both the CJEU and the ECtHR resort to the 
language of ‘balancing’ and ‘striking a fair balance’ to resolve fundamental rights clashes in 
the area of intermediary liability. But how, exactly, are we to understand this terminology?  
 
The surrounding literature suggests that balancing, as a judicial tool, can be interpreted in at 
least two ways.46 It can first be understood as a concrete weighing of competing interests in the 
particular circumstances of an individual case. This is the kind of balancing – also termed ‘ad 
hoc balancing’ – that usually conjures up the metaphorical image of a pair of scales.47 When 
courts resort to ad hoc balancing, they are attempting to determine which ‘way the scales tip’48 
in each individual case and rule accordingly. Balancing can, however, also be understood in a 
different sense: as achieving an equilibrium or compromise between clashing interests. 
According to this interpretation, in the language of the scales metaphor, courts balance in 
search of a solution that levels the scales, rather than having them tip to one side.49 The resulting 
equilibrium, once found, is usually of a more principled or abstract nature. Hence, equilibrium 
balancing tends to offer greater guidance for future cases than the ad hoc approach, thereby 
increasing legal certainty.50 
 
In this article, we propose a fair-balance-as-compromise solution to the intermediary liability 
question. The idea behind our compromise approach is that all parties involved in the 
fundamental rights clash (i.e. the intermediary, the end-user and the third party) must share 
responsibility. They all have to accept that their fundamental rights cannot be maximally or 
absolutely protected. Instead, they must each make (small) sacrifices, so that an equilibrium 
may be found. The benefit of this approach is that a winner-take-all situation is replaced by one 
in which the parties’ fundamental rights – all of which, according to the ECtHR, deserve ‘equal 
respect’ – survive, co-existing alongside each other.  
 
                                                          
46 See Aleinikoff (n 39) 946.  
47 For a critique of the scales metaphor of balancing, see Smet (n 34) Chapters 4 and 5. 
48 See Aleinikoff (n 39) 946. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Are Blocking Injunctions against ISPs Allowed in Europe? Copyright Enforcement 
in the Post-Telekabel EU Legal Landscape’ (2014) 9 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 819 (noting 
that ISPs typically want concrete guidance). 
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There are good reasons for preferring a compromise solution over a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
approach to intermediary liability cases. In particular, assuming the intermediary is not itself 
engaging in or encouraging infringing behaviour, it appears disproportionate to assign it the 
sole responsibility of taking enforcement measures. For several reasons, it may be difficult to 
determine which duties can legitimately be imposed on intermediaries to prevent or remove 
alleged infringing activities. First, it is unclear why the intermediary – provided it is not 
complicit in the acts – should bear the full burden of ensuring protection of the  fundamental 
rights of the alleged victim of, say, a defamatory comment or a copyright infringement. Second, 
the imposed measures may be overbroad and thus block lawful conduct as well. Third, 
intermediaries are subject to legal and technical restrictions, as well as (possibly prohibitive) 
costs, all of which limit its ‘policing’ possibilities. This means that, without specialised legal 
assistance, it may be difficult for them to determine whether or not their users’ conduct is 
lawful.51 The current state of technology may also be such as to simply make intermediaries 
unable to prevent or locate all infringing activities anyway. Finally, even if technically possible, 
it may be prohibitively expensive for intermediaries to implement the necessary measures.52 
 
In these circumstances, a compromise solution on which each party to the fundamental rights 
clash bears part of the burden appears preferable.53 We suggest that such a compromise solution 
is, in fact, already implicit in the existing European legal framework on intermediary liability 
described above.  
   
B. Who Should Find the Compromise? 
 
What might a compromise between clashing fundamental rights look like in the area of 
intermediary liability? Helpful examples can be found in ECtHR rulings in other fields of law. 
The ECtHR’s case law on counter-demonstrations and on the protection of witnesses at trial 
provides particularly helpful inspiration.54 Both those situations entail, like intermediary 
liability cases, a clash between fundamental rights. The first concerns opposing  claims to 
freedom of assembly; the second centres around a conflict between a suspect’s right to a fair 
trial and a witness’ right to life, privacy and/or physical integrity. In tackling these fundamental 
rights clashes, the ECtHR has sought a compromise solution. On this compromise solution, 
neither right is sacrificed to the benefit of the other. Instead, the relevant right-holders are asked 
to accept mutual, but minimal sacrifices that allow an equilibrium to be found. The ECtHR has 
achieved this by imposing positive duties on the State aimed at ensuring maximum protection 
of the fundamental rights in play. In this way, it has attempted, in line with a compromise 
approach to balancing, to level the balancing scales instead of tipping them towards one of the 
clashing rights. 
 
How does this approach pan out in practice? In its counter-demonstration case law, the ECtHR 
insists that the State’s core duty is ‘to protect the right of assembly of both demonstrating 
groups, and … find the least restrictive means that would, in principle, enable both 
                                                          
51 Lisl Brunner, ‘The Liability of an Online Intermediary for Third Party Content – The Watchdog Becomes the 
Monitor: Intermediary Liability after Delfi v Estonia’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 172. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Contra Orit Fischman Afori, ‘Proportionality – A New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law’ (2014) 45 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 909-910. 
54 See Olivier De Schutter and Françoise Tulkens, ‘Rights in Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights as a 
Pragmatic Institution’ in Eva Brems (ed), Conflicts between Fundamental Rights (Intersentia, 2008) 204-205; 
Sébastien Van Drooghenbroeck, ‘L’horizontalisation des droits de l’homme’ in Hugues Dumont et al. (eds), La 
responsabilité, face cachée des droits de l’homme (Bruylant, 2005) 385. 
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demonstrations to take place’.55 This entails taking preventive measures, including securing 
sufficient police presence, to separate demonstrating groups.56 Such measures have a minimal 
impact on protestors’ freedom of assembly, given that their freedom of movement is somewhat 
restricted. But they also ensure optimal protection of the clashing fundamental rights. In other 
words, the preventive measures achieve a viable compromise. 
 
A similar compromise solution lies at the heart of the ECtHR’s case law on the protection of 
witnesses at trial.57 Here, the ECtHR holds that, when the life, privacy or physical integrity of 
a witness would be imperilled if she were forced to give live evidence in court, measures must 
be taken to protect her fundamental rights.58 Such measures, however, threaten to undermine 
the suspect’s right to a fair trial. Cognizant of this danger, the ECtHR imposes a duty on States 
to take counterbalancing measures aimed at guaranteeing both adequate protection for 
witnesses and fairness of the suspect’s trial.59 Such counterbalancing measures might include 
allowing counsel for the defence to put questions to the witness and allowing the judge, jury 
and/or prosecutor to see and hear the witness give evidence, without the defendant being 
present.60 These counterbalancing measures are intended to reach a compromise between the 
clashing fundamental rights of witness and suspect. 
 
We suggest that similar solutions – in terms of safeguards to reach a compromise between 
clashing fundamental rights – should be searched for in the area of intermediary liability. This 
is in line with the CJEU’s case law. Recall that in Telekabel, the CJEU held that respecting the 
fair balance between all relevant rights means taking measures that at a minimum discourage 
infringement, while also avoiding unnecessary interference with the rights of both 
intermediaries and end-users.61 Yet crucially – and curiously – while acknowledging the need 
for compromise in that case, the CJEU also avoided imposing the duty to achieve a fair balance 
on the State. Instead, it imposed this duty directly on the intermediary. The intermediary was 
thus handed the double-edged sword of implementing the requisite enforcement measures, 
allowing it to pick the measures that suit it most and handing it the perilous responsibility of 
selecting those that do not unduly infringe users’ rights.62 In doing so, the Court put the 
intermediary in the position of the sheriff, responsible for policing the boundaries of the 
fundamental rights of users and alleged victims of infringing activities.63 
  
This approach of the CJEU appears at odds with a core principle of fundamental rights law, 
under which human rights duties are imposed on States, not private persons or entities.64 The 
CJEU’s departure from this principle could have a number of reasons. One possibility could be 
that the CJEU was caught up in the specificities of the Austrian legal device of ‘outcome 
prohibitions’, at issue in Telekabel. Such ‘outcome prohibitions’ allow courts to order 
                                                          
55 ECtHR, Fáber v Hungary [2012] ECHR 2026, para 43. 
56 Ibid, para 44; ECtHR, Öllinger v Austria App no 76900/01 (29 June 2006), para 48. 
57 ECtHR, Doorson v the Netherlands [1996] ECHR 14; ECtHR, Van Mechelen and Others v the Netherlands 
[1997] ECHR 22; ECtHR, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 2127. 
58 See Doorson (n 57) para 70; Al-Khawaja and Tahery (n 57) para 123. 
59 See Doorson (n 57) para 72; Al-Khawaja and Tahery (n 57) para 147. 
60 See Doorson (n 57) para 73.  
61 See Telekabel Wien (n 26) para 64. 
62 Ibid, para 57. 
63 Ibid, paras 55-64. For discussion, see Angelopoulos (n 50). 
64 David J Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn 
2014) 23 (‘the Convention is a treaty that imposes obligations only upon states. [...] Insofar as the Convention 
touches the conduct of private persons, it does so only indirectly through such positive obligations as it imposes 
upon a state’). 
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defendants to achieve a certain result without specifying the measures that should be taken for 
that purpose. By focusing its attention on this particular device under domestic law, the Court 
may well have failed to notice that its own reasoning could be read as imposing fundamental 
rights duties directly on intermediaries, instead of States. Here, however, we would venture an 
alternative explanation. That explanation is tied to legal conceptions of the internet as a place 
that offers new opportunities for freedom of expression and democracy,65 but also poses new 
dangers of rights infringements. This dual vision of the internet is reflected in the European 
legal approach to intermediary liability. In Delfi, the ECtHR based its analysis on the finding 
that: 
 
user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented 
platform for the exercise of freedom of expression … [but] alongside these benefits, 
certain dangers may also arise. Defamatory and other types of clearly unlawful 
speech, including hate speech and speech inciting violence, can be disseminated 
like never before, worldwide, in a matter of seconds, and sometimes remain 
persistently available online.66  
 
Against this backdrop of a ‘digital environment [in which] the services of intermediaries may 
increasingly be used by third parties for infringing activities’, the EU legal framework on 
intermediary liability insists that ‘[i]n many cases … intermediaries are best placed to bring 
such infringing activities to an end’.67 When the CJEU imposes duties on intermediaries to 
achieve a fair balance between users’ rights and alleged victims’ rights, it follows this line of 
thinking. This had led the Court to conclude that, given the (relative) absence of State control 
over the internet, intermediaries can (or should) be assigned policing duties.  
 
Yet, on the argument we are developing in this article, the responsibility to achieve a fair 
balance should not be shifted to the intermediary.68 Doing so fails to achieve the equilibrium 
we are looking for. Indeed, as one of us has previously noted, ‘without concrete instructions 
from the courts [or legislator], an ISP has no real way of knowing what is and what is not 
‘reasonable’ in the eyes of the law’.69 Thus, it also has no way of securing a viable fair balance. 
Europe’s highest courts would also do well to heed Balkin’s warning that: 
 
[m]any of the same features of the digital infrastructure that democratize speech 
also make the digital infrastructure the most powerful and most tempting target for 
speech regulation and surveillance. Although the digital infrastructure frees 
speakers from dependence on older media gatekeepers, it does so through the 
creation of new intermediaries that offer both states and private parties new 
opportunities for control and surveillance.70 
 
                                                          
65 On the Internet as providing new opportunities for democracy and freedom of expression, see Jack M Balkin, 
‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture’ (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1-55. See also ECtHR, 
Cengiz and Others v Turkey [2015] ECHR 1052, para 52 (‘les sites internet contribuent grandement à améliorer 
l’accès du public à l’actualité et, de manière générale, à faciliter la communication de l’information … La 
possibilité pour les individus de s’exprimer sur Internet constitue un outil sans précédent d’exercice de la liberté 
d’expression’); dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó and Tsotsoria in Delfi (n 28) para 6 (‘The Internet … is a sphere 
of robust public discourse with novel opportunities for enhanced democracy.’). 
66 See Delfi (n 28) para 110. 
67 See Copyright Directive (n 18) Recital 59.  
68 See Martinet Farano (n 12) 180  
69 See Angelopoulos (n 50) 819. 
70 Jack M Balkin, ‘Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation’ (2014) 127 Harvard Law Review 2304. 
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States – whether individually at the national or jointly at the supranational EU level71 – should 
not be allowed to escape or ‘delegate’ their basic fundamental rights obligations.72 In the area 
of intermediary liability, those obligations include providing a legal framework that strikes a 
fair balance between the relevant fundamental rights.73 Once set up, it is up to intermediaries, 
right-holders and users to implement the – balanced – framework. Just like all other parties to 
a fundamental rights clash, intermediaries should be made to follow the legal rules provided 
by national (and supra-national) authorities, not forced to invent them.  
 
C. How to Reach a Compromise  
 
So far we have argued that a compromise solution should be found between clashing 
fundamental rights in the area of intermediary liability. We have also noted that the job of 
deciding the shape of that compromise should fall to the State. Fortunately, the requisite 
compromise solution need not be devised from scratch. On the contrary, several guiding factors 
can already be found in the existing EU legal framework. This is unsurprising: as the CJEU 
pointed out in Promusicae, the EU directives must be understood as containing the 
‘mechanisms allowing [the] different rights and interests to be balanced’.74 For example, 
Article 15 ECD prohibits the imposition of general monitoring obligations on intermediaries. 
Based on a separate fundamental rights analysis, the CJEU has come to the same conclusion: 
imposing general monitoring obligations on intermediaries upsets the fair balance.75  
 
Additional guiding factors can also be found in the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR. First, 
it is clear from the rulings of both courts that reaching a compromise requires awareness of the 
implications for all relevant fundamental rights. As duly noted by the CJEU, not only the 
fundamental rights of the intermediary and the right-holder should be included in the balance, 
but also those of the user.76 Of course, the existence of a triadic relationship makes finding a 
suitable compromise more challenging.  
 
Second, the case law indicates that a fair balance can only be achieved if the core of all clashing 
fundamental rights remains unaffected. As the ECtHR held in Delfi, ‘a balance must be struck 
that retains the essence of [the] rights’.77 Indeed, achieving a compromise presupposes that 
none of the clashing fundamental rights is rendered meaningless. Instead, as the CJEU has 
noted it is vital to keep the ‘very substance’ of the rights intact.78 This precondition offers 
                                                          
71 In our assessment, the European Commission is – given its past initiatives on harmonisation in the area 
intermediary liability – particularly well placed among relevant stakeholders to develop a legal framework that 
secures a workable compromise or equilibrium. See also Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Sketching the Outline of a 
Ghost: The Fair Balance between Copyright and Fundamental Rights in Intermediary Third Party Liability’ (2015) 
17 Info 87 (‘if further guidance is to be provided, it should arguably be formulated not by the CJEU, but by the 
EU legislator’). 
72 See Fanny Coudert and Evi Werkers, ‘In the Aftermath of the Promusicae Case: How to Strike the Balance?’ 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 71. 
73 Otherwise, as Horten, using the example of copyright, has emphasised, the risk exists that no resolution will be 
possible: ‘When two industries with conflicting interests are asked to self-regulate, it only entrenches the 
differences in their business models, and that is why “cooperation” between Internet service providers and the 
entertainment industry struggles to work without a court ruling.’ See Monica Horten, The Closing of the Net 
(Polity, 2016) 142. 
74 See Promusicae (n 19) para 66. The same idea is explicitly declared by Recital 41 of the E-Commerce Directive, 
according to which the Directive ‘strikes a balance between the different interests at stake’. 
75 See Scarlet (n 24) para 53; Netlog (n 25) para 51. 
76 See Scarlet (n 24) para 48; Netlog (n 25) para 50; Telekabel Wien (n 26) para 47. 
77 See Delfi (n 28) para 110. 
78 See Telekabel Wien (n 26) para 51. 
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further support to arguments against the imposition of e.g. general monitoring obligations on 
intermediaries. At the same time, it also explains why (as we shall argue below) intermediaries 
should not be granted absolute immunity. In the former scenario, intermediaries’ freedom to 
conduct a business would be jeopardised and users’ rights to data protection would be hollowed 
out. In the latter scenario, right-holders (for example, the targets of defamatory comments) 
would find it extremely difficult or even impossible to vindicate their fundamental rights (for 
instance when the infringing user acts anonymously).  
 
In addition, we submit that the differentiated impact on distinct fundamental rights of alleged 
victims should also be reflected in the fair balance solution. In other words, we require a 
compromise solution that is adjusted to best fit each situation. We will elaborate on this point 
in the next section. Here, we formulate the gist of the idea: any compromise reached in the area 
of intermediary liability needs to take account of the varying impact of infringing activities, 
based on the harm done to the right-holder and, particularly, the right affected. On an individual 
scale, for instance, child pornography and child abuse generally inflict greater harm than 
infringement of a large movie corporation’s intellectual property rights.79 Such differences in 
impact should, we posit, be reflected in the measures taken to achieve a fair balance in the area 
of intermediary liability.80  
  
IV. Fair Balance in Practice: Notice-and-Action as Compromise 
 
How, then, do we move from the theoretical concept of fair-balance-as-compromise to 
achieving a fair balance in practice? More specifically, how can a compromise solution be 
inserted into European intermediary liability law? As already noted above, a hint on the way 
forward was delivered by the ECtHR in its Delfi and MTE rulings. There, the Strasbourg Court, 
talking of the notice-and-takedown system, declared that: 
 
If accompanied by effective procedures allowing for rapid response, this system 
can in the Court’s view function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing 
the rights and interests of all those involved.81 
 
This indicates that a (partial) answer can be found exactly where it has been all along: in notice-
and-takedown regimes. But is notice-and-takedown suitable for attaining a fair balance in all 
cases of intermediary liability? The ECtHR quote suggests that it is not. While Delfi and MTE 
both accepted notice-and-takedown as one possible representation of a fair balance, this is only 
with regard to ‘many cases’. Presumably, in  some other cases, the result will have to be 
different. Indeed, Delfi itself concerned one of the exceptions. According to the Strasbourg 
court, in cases of hate speech and incitement to violence the standard must  impose stricter 
requirements on intermediaries.  
 
It is also worth considering that, for all its advantages, notice-and-takedown has come under 
severe criticism as all too often unduly unbalanced. Multiple scholars have pointed out the 
                                                          
79 See Mylly (n 45) 125. 
80 See, in support, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ‘Intermediary Liability & Freedom of Expression: Recent 
Developments in the EU Notice & Action Initiate’ (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review 52 (noting that 
most stakeholders agree that ‘criminal content such as child abuse should not be treated the same way as 
infringement of copyrights’). 
81 See Delfi (n 28) para 159; MTE (n 29) para 91. 
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regime’s severe disadvantages.82 The problems are particularly acute in Europe, given the lack 
of detailed guidance on notice-and-takedown procedures provided by EU law. At the same 
time, other more systematic approaches to notice-and-takedown also present drawbacks. For 
example, the US’s detailed DMCA procedure does build in a number of safeguards against 
misuse that could conceivably help improve the European rules.83 At the same time, as 
commentators point out, notice-and-takedown’s primary disadvantage of providing one-sided 
incentives to take down content to entities that do not have the constitutional authority and 
legal expertise of the courts nor, as a general rule, the desire to assume such responsibility 
persists within the US system.84 Especially striking in the US regime is the requirement that 
notifications of alleged infringements need only contain a statement that the information in the 
notification is accurate, whereas counter-notifications by content providers are made under 
penalty of perjury.85 Arguably, at least in cases that do not involve manifestly illegal content, 
the material should remain in place until it has been proven illegal by a court, without any 
threat of liability for the intermediary.86  
 
Returning to the two ECtHR judgments, the main  implication seems to be the need for 
calibration of permissible intermediary liability rules, depending on the type of content 
involved. Hate speech and incitement to violence may, for instance, be more sharply dealt with 
than merely offensive comments, without fear of human rights violations. The next logical line 
of inquiry is obvious: what lies in between these two extremes, i.e. what should the fate of other 
types of illegality be? MTE made clear that automatic takedown is not appropriate for 
defamatory comments. But what would be a correct response to defamation? And what should 
be demanded of intermediaries where, as in the CJEU cases, the question is one of intellectual 
property infringement? What if the odious crime of child pornography is what hangs in the ‘fair 
balance’? 
 
In what follows, we attempt to answer these questions. We do so by recourse to a more refined 
concept of ‘notice-and-action’, one that is capable of addressing all kinds of illegality, each in 
a differentiated way that suits its target best.  
 
A. Notice-and-Action: Which Measures and Do They Achieve a Viable 
Compromise? 
 
                                                          
82 Gregory R Hagen, ‘“Modernizing” ISP Copyright Liability’ in Michael Geist (ed), From ‘Radical Extremism’ 
to ‘Balanced Copyright’: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Irwin Law, 2010) 385; Christian Ahlert, 
Chris Marsden and Chester Yung, ‘How "Liberty" Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery Shopper Tests 
Internet Content Self-Regulation’, available at: 
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/liberty.pdf; Jennifer M Urban and Laura Quilter, 
‘Efficient Process or Chilling Effects? Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’ (2006) 22 Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 621; Kuczerawy (n 80) 46. 
83 Lilian Edwards, ‘The Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related 
Rights’ (2011) WIPO Study 11, available at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/wipo_isoc_ge_11/wipo_isoc_ge_11_ref_01_edwards.pdf. 
84 DLA Piper, ‘EU Study on the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society – New Rules for 
a New Age?’, November 2009, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7022. 
85 Nicolo Zingales, ‘Internet Intermediary Liability: Identifying Best Practices for Africa’ (2013) Association for 
Progressive Communications (APC), available at 
www.apc.org/en/system/files/APCInternetIntermediaryLiability_BestPracticesAfrica_20131125.pdf. 




In response to its identified shortcomings, the notice-and-takedown regime has, over the years, 
undergone considerable diversification. The result has been the emergence of a rich continuum 
of what can, following the example of the European Commission, be termed ‘notice-and-
action’ systems across the globe. Each of these is designed to approach unlawful online content 
in a subtly, but significantly different manner. The most prominent available alternatives – 
ranked from least to most invasive from the perspective of the intermediary and the internet 
user – are the following: 
 





6. Notice-and-stay-down  
7. Automatic takedown (strict liability) 
 
The emergence of these various ‘notice-and-action’ solutions indicates the increased 
sophistication of the discussion surrounding intermediary liability. Where once the options 
were few, now they have multiplied. We suggest that this development is appropriate: as the 
dust settles around information society, the legal regulation of intermediaries has begun to 
mature. As a result, a uniform response to unlawful online content can no longer guarantee a 
balanced solution.87 Different types of online wrongdoing must instead be met with distinct 
responses: the horizontal approach favoured so far by the European legislator should be 
transitioned into a vertical one.88 While to date, the ongoing diversification of approaches has 
been primarily geographic, with different countries investigating different solutions, in this 
article we venture to argue that the time has come to mix and match. Benefiting from each 
other’s creativity and experimentation, best practices for the different fields of law can be 
developed by coupling appropriate systems with appropriate situations. The ultimate result we 
propose is a calibrated notice-and-action regime that actually does achieve a fair balance. 
 
On the basis of this idea, in the final part of this article, we detail our proposal for a calibrated 
system. Before delving into the full measure-to-field assignment process, however, it is 
important to first separate the chaff from the grain. We therefore begin by suggesting that some 
of the above-listed options fail entirely to achieve the desired compromise. Since they do not 
strike a fair balance, they should arguably not be further pursued.  There are three wholly 
unsatisfactory solutions. 
 
1. Absolute Immunity: No Compromise 
 
The first unfair and unbalanced system is, in our opinion, absolute immunity. Absolute 
immunity would push the ECD’s safe harbour system to its extreme, protecting intermediaries 
against any  liability or obligation to intervene against unlawful content, irrespective of the 
circumstances. The argument in favour of such an approach would be that intermediaries are 
mere ‘dumb pipe’, i.e. uninvolved go-betweens that should not be used as scapegoats for the 
misdeeds of others. Yet, whether that continues to be true as soon as an intermediary has both 
knowledge that unlawful content exists on its systems and the power to put an end to it or – 
much more – where it took active measures to encourage or promote unlawfulness on its 
                                                          




systems, is questionable. With this in mind, we suggest that granting intermediaries absolute 
immunity is incapable of achieving a fair balance. It does nothing to offer a compromise in the 
intermediary liability debate. Instead, it approaches the issue in a decidedly one-sided manner. 
Absolute immunity concedes no burden-sharing by the intermediary, which is instead allowed 
to wash its hands entirely of illegality committed using the services that it supplies.  
 
Since absolute immunity does not aim at a compromise solution, we will be setting it aside as 
a possible option. Intermediaries may certainly not always be subjected to liability, but they 
should only be absolved from it where they have in no legally relevant way contributed to a 
wrong. Absolute immunity on the sole basis of the identity of the defendant or the type of 
service it provides must be rejected. 
 
2. Notice-and-Stay-Down: No Viable Compromise 
 
Another option is also of dubious balancing credentials: notice-and-stay-down. Notice-and-
stay-down requires that the intermediary, after receiving a notification of illegal information 
hosted on its systems, not only block or remove the information, but also take additional 
measures to ensure that it is not subsequently reposted by the same user or others. The scheme 
enjoys great popularity in Germany89 and had for some time gained favour before the French 
lower courts as well.90 More recently, it appears to have caught the eye of the European 
Commission, which in its December 2015 Communication91 dabbled with the idea as a possible 
solution for intermediary liability, at least in the area of copyright. 
 
Although notice-and-stay-down is not as thoroughly one-sided as absolute immunity, we 
submit that it nevertheless fails to offer a viable compromise. Instead, it results in 
disproportionate demands on intermediaries, with the potential to have consequent  effects for 
innocent end-users as well. The requirement that a notice be issued before action is taken does 
of course allow for the prior identification of actual wrongdoing. Post-notification, however, 
the system slides too far in the other direction. 
 
In particular, the identification  of new postings of content previously notified as unlawful to 
the intermediary requires the implementation of systems for the monitoring of all user-
submitted information. Screening out illegal content cannot occur without filtering the totality 
of content. Whether this takes place through human supervision or the installation of automated 
filtering systems, the unavoidable result is general monitoring of the type forbidden by Article 
15 ECD. As the CJEU’s two Sabam cases have demonstrated, it would further constitute a 
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violation of users’ and intermediaries’ fundamental rights. For one thing, notice-and-stay-down 
requires the implementation of complicated and costly systems that would impose a significant 
burden on business models, particularly of smaller companies. Interferences with the freedom 
of expression of end-users are also likely, since false positives – i.e. erroneous removal of 
lawful content –  cannot be excluded. Moreover, awareness on the part of users that their 
comments are being monitored can result in chilling effects on speech, causing them to refrain 
from commenting even when their intended comments would not be illegal.92 Finally, the 
systematic analysis and processing of information to allow the identification of users, whether 
they are implicated in the notified wrongdoing or not, also constitute a disproportionate 
interference with users’ right to the protection of personal data. 
  
As a result, the introduction of a ‘notice-and-stay-down’ regime is, in our view, incapable of 
enabling a fair balance. It is indicative that in France, where the concept of ‘stay-down’ first 
originated, the Cour de cassation has since rejected the possibility as disproportionate to the 
aim pursued.93 
 
3. Automatic Takedown 
 
A final option that presents fair balance difficulties is that of automatic takedown. Automatic 
takedown essentially constitutes a strict liability regime for internet intermediaries. It therefore 
represents the opposite of absolute immunity. Under this scheme, intermediaries are held liable 
for the wrongdoings of their users without further ado. Should this be a permissible option 
under a calibrated system? We suggest that, in principle, it should not. As noted above, in Delfi, 
automatic takedown was suggested as the appropriate reaction to cases of hate speech and 
incitement to violence. Nevertheless, this approach leaves an obvious elephant in the room: if 
that is to be the case and given that the host service provider did not supply the unlawful content 
itself, how is it to know that it is there? If it does not know, then it cannot take the content 
down. This practical consideration remained unaddressed in Delfi by both the ECtHR and the 
Estonian courts. If there is to be no notice, the obvious answer must be ‘through either the 
installation of automatic filtering technology or through human moderation’. Both options, 
however, are legally problematic.  
 
Indeed, the subsequent ECtHR judgment in MTE, while ostensibly corroborating the Delfi 
logic, does a good job of highlighting the impossibility of the position into which Delfi had 
earlier been placed. A demand of filtering, MTE pronounces, ‘amounts to requiring excessive 
and impracticable forethought capable of undermining freedom of the right to impart 
information on the Internet’.94 Arguably, the same holds true of human moderation, which, if 
anything, represents an interference far greater than automatic machine oversight.  
 
Limiting the effects only to certain kinds of illegal content, as Delfi suggests, does not improve 
matters. For one thing, the correct identification of hate speech is sometimes a difficult one for 
even the best-trained lawyers,95 let along jumpy internet service providers concerned for their 
                                                          
92 Ken D Kumayama, ‘A Right to Pseudonymity’ (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 427. 
93 See La société Google France c. La société Bach films, Cour de cassation (Première chambre civile), 12 July 
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94 See MTE (n 29) para 82.  
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contributes to this confusion. See below (n 119). 
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own liability. This problem was correctly identified by the CJEU in the Scarlet and Netlog 
filtering cases in the area of copyright:96 as this kind of wrongdoing is not always easy to 
recognise, being dependent on contextual analysis and a strong grasp of nuanced legal rules, it 
can lead to a disproportionate takedown of lawful content. The result is an adverse impact on 
free speech. The same would be true of hate speech and defamation. 
 
In addition, by their very definition, the effects of filtering and human moderation cannot easily 
be limited to only certain content, as both necessarily involve the examination of the totality of 
information on the host provider’s services. They would, accordingly, have the same 
deleterious effect that notice-and-stay-down schemes have on the privacy and data protection 
rights of all end-users, as well as the intermediary’s freedom to conduct its business. Under 
these circumstances, the complete closure of online commentating spaces will often be the only 
practicable method of preventing the dissemination of unlawful content without engaging in 
general monitoring. Yet MTE clearly warns against this option, as inevitably affecting not only 
the freedom to provide information that amounts to hate speech, but of all information.  
 
In view of the above, we conclude that automatic takedown, much like full immunity and 
notice-and-stay-down, fails to reach a viable compromise. There is no burden-sharing; instead 
the intermediary and end-users must alone assume the full responsibility. Automatic takedown 
can therefore not be incorporated into a balance-based system of intermediary liability.  
 
4. An Exception for Child Pornography? 
 
At this point, however, pause for thought is necessary. Although automatic takedown and 
notice-and-stay-down are incompatible with the notion of viable compromise, it may be rash 
to consider these systems altogether inapplicable to intermediary liability. While the notion of 
fair balance has been applied to all intermediary liability cases that have  been considered by 
the CJEU and ECtHR, we note that the range of these cases has been limited to intellectual 
property rights, hate speech and defamation. With caution, we venture to suggest that if there 
is one area where automatic takedown and notice-and-stay-down may still be considered, it is 
the as yet unexplored – by Europe’s highest courts – area of child pornography.97  
 
For one thing, although cases of child pornography present tricky problems in their own right, 
from a practical perspective child pornography is generally much easier to identify than other 
wrongdoings.98 Indeed, child pornography by and large falls into the category of ‘I know it 
when I see it’99 and should thus be easily recognisable, not only by experts, but by lay-persons 
as well. Machines may also more successfully be taught to identify it, with relatively few false 
positives.100  
 
Additionally, it should be considered that the magnitude of the wrong inflicted on the victim 
of child pornography will usually be of far greater proportions than that occasioned by other 
wrongs. Arguably, this should affect outcomes. Indeed, as Recital 46 of Directive 2011/92/EU 
                                                          
96 See Scarlet (n 24) para 52; Netlog (n 25) para 50. 
97 Contra Karel Demeyer, Eva Lievens and Jos Dumortier, ‘Blocking and Removing Illegal Child Sexual Content: 
Analysis from a Technical and Legal Perspective’ (2012) Policy & Internet 1-23. 
98 Contra ibid, 14. 
99 See Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), a United States Supreme Court decision in which Justice Potter 
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100 Richard Allen, ‘Experience from Facebook’s Perspective’, conference presentation at Privatising the Rule of 
Law Online: Freedom of Speech, Copyright and Platforms in the Digital Single Market, 16 June 2016, European 
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on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography 
states, child pornography ‘cannot be construed as the expression of an opinion’.101 As a result, 
according to the Directive, in order to combat it, it is necessary not only to remove such content, 
but also to make it more difficult for offenders to upload it onto the publicly available web.  
 
In this regard, it should also be recalled that the CJEU and ECtHR only accept fair balance 
where the rights in conflict are ‘relative’ ones that deserve ‘equal respect’. While the majority 
of rights protected by the Charter and the Convention are of this kind, that is not the case for 
all of them. Child pornography cases may, in particular, implicate the right to freedom from 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment protected under Article 3 of the 
Convention and Article 4 of the Charter. This is one of the rare human and fundamental rights 
that is not relative,102 but absolute and inviolable and which therefore cannot justifiably be 
restricted to protect countervailing interests.103 As such, it may not be subjected to balancing 
procedures where it clashes with relative rights: instead, all measures that can be taken to 
protect it, should be taken. Therefore, where the imposition of obligations on intermediaries 
has negative implications for the protection of children from abuse, fair balance will not be the 
appropriate regulatory or judicial tool.  
 
On this basis, we conclude that allowing a state to oblige intermediaries to assume an automatic 
takedown obligation in relation to child pornography should not be considered a violation of 
either the intermediary’s own fundamental rights or those of third party users. Such a system 
is, for instance, already in effect in Finland.104 We also suggest that notice-and-stay-down can 
function as a good back-up option for detecting any offending material that manages to evade 
the intermediary’s automatic mechanisms. To plug any remaining holes, notice-and-suspension 
may also be considered.  
 
At the same time, where the intermediary has implemented reasonable measures in line with 
the state of the art to take child pornography down, but some content nevertheless slips through 
its systems, we are clear that no liability should be imposed on it. In such cases, the only remedy 
that may be envisioned are court orders to proceed with removing or blocking specific 
identified content: the intermediary has done all it can and holding it liable for the wrongdoings 
of others serves no protective purpose for the victim of the wrong.105 
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B. Fine-tuning the Viable Compromises: Distinct Notice-and-Action Measures for 
Different Clashes 
 
Above we rejected three options that categorically fail to reach a viable compromise. What 
remains is to allocate those that do achieve a fair balance. In proposing our ‘vertical’ notice-
and-action approach, we are led by two guiding factors.  
 
First and foremost, we suggest that differences in the seriousness of (alleged) interferences 
with fundamental rights caused by online speech must be taken into account. Examined on an 
individual scale – i.e. taking each individual infringement separately – the harm caused by 
certain types of content is, generally speaking, graver than that occasioned by other forms of 
speech. Arguably, graver harm requires more decisive action. Second, the ease with which 
breaches can be verified by host service providers should also be taken into account. Clearly, 
if intermediaries are to be trusted with the task of preventing illegality, it is imperative to assess 
to what extent it is possible for a private party without the necessary authority or expertise to 
confidently diagnose online illegality.  
 
Guided by these two factors, below we aim to strike a series of viable compromises by 
proposing a calibrated system. We posit that the differentiated impact of online speech on 
different rights, as well as the diagnostic disparities that accompany it, should be reflected in 
the kinds of notice-and-action measures that can be imposed on intermediaries to offer redress 
to (allegedly) injured parties. The ideas behind our calibrated system are as follows. Whereas 
a direct takedown obligation may be justified upon receipt of notice of the causation of serious 
harm, imposing the same obligation with regard to less harmful wrongdoing would upset the 
fair balance between the right-holders involved. Likewise, where harms of equal magnitude 
are threatened, but it is more difficult for an intermediary to legally identify one type of harm 
than the other, this should be reflected in the kinds of measures that can be imposed on the 
intermediary.  
 
When combined, the comparative gravity of the infringement and the relative difficulty in 
establishing its legal character lead us to the following multipronged proposal: notice-and-
notice for intellectual property rights’ infringement, notice-wait-and-takedown for defamation 
and notice-and-takedown, combined with occasional notice-and-suspension, for hate speech. 
As an added possibility, notice-and-judicial-takedown should be available in all cases. 
Naturally, other combinations covering additional areas of law can be envisioned. Due to 
considerations of space, however, this article is limited to the most common online 
wrongdoings involving intermediaries. 
 
The end result delivers an injection of much needed nuance into the existing rules. But does 
the replacement of one blunt tool – the current ‘horizontal’ approach of the directives – with a 
variety of potentially equally crude instruments further our objective of securing a ‘fair 
balance’?106 We recognise that important variations within types of infringement may well 
require further refinement. For example, different cases of defamation may cause different 
gradations of harm, which arguably deserve different treatment. With this in mind, we note that 
our proposal is intended primarily to open up the intermediary liability debate. In particular, 
we wish to invite legislators (especially the EU legislator), courts (especially the CJEU and 
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ECtHR) and scholars to consider a move away from a ‘horizontal’ approach towards a 
‘vertical’ solution.  
 
We further suggest that, while there are strong arguments against notice-and-action schemes, 
the fast-paced digital age demands workable if rough-and-ready ways to deal with the vast 
volume of illegal material it generates. It should be kept in mind that solutions tailored to 
individual cases can by their nature not easily be moulded into law. Legislation is instead 
limited to general solutions. Truly taking the concrete circumstances of each case into account 
would require not legislative, but judicial involvement. Yet, court cases are time-consuming 
and resource-intensive. Undoubtedly, our calibrated system would require further refinement 
of each of its individual branches before it could be adopted into law. We are clear that any 
new EU-level notice-and-action regimes should provide more guidance than that given by 
Article 14 ECD. Nevertheless, we believe that our proposal puts the debate en route to 
operationalising the ‘fair balance’ sought by Europe’s highest courts in response to the 
intermediary liability question.  
 
1. Compromise and Copyright: Notice-and-Notice 
 
As we saw above, existing notice-and-takedown systems have come under increased scrutiny 
for failing to provide a viable compromise between clashing fundamental rights in cases of 
intermediary liability.107 This criticism is especially valid with regard to the area of copyright 
law.  
 
Since sending out takedown notices is a low-cost, minor-effort activity, copyright holders, 
particularly when in the form of large movie and music corporations, are prone to issuing 
dubious notices.108 And because intermediaries, for their part, have little incentive to defend 
the rights of internet users and much to lose if they ignore filed notices, the logically prudent 
course for them will usually be to unquestioningly follow up on notices received and remove 
the content at issue.109 Yet, arguably copyright is not an area of law whose violation can always 
be easily ascertained, since the assessment of a particular piece of information as an 
infringement will depend on the particular circumstances at play in the case at hand. For 
example, the posting of the same digital copy of a film may be illegal for one user in certain 
circumstances , while entirely legal for another user in different circumstances, depending on 
such considerations as the position taken by the right-holder, whether the user was obliged to 
obtain a license and any relevant exceptions or limitations.110  
 
It is also worth considering that, despite the progress made in the European harmonisation of 
copyright, significant pockets of fragmentation persist. This further encumbers intermediaries 
attempting to correctly determine the public domain status of works in multiple jurisdictions.111 
False takedowns are therefore a real risk. As Seltzer notes, when applied to copyright, the 
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notice-and-takedown system instead of acting as ‘the law’s shield for service providers [thus] 
becomes, paradoxically, a sword against the public’.112  
 
In view of these shortcomings, we submit that the system of choice in the area of copyright 
should instead be that of notice-and-notice. This mechanism was first adopted by Canada as 
the centrepiece of its 2012 digital copyright reform.113 Under notice-and-notice, the 
intermediary is not obliged  to take down the content brought to its attention by the notice, but 
merely to forward the notice to the indicated end-user. In parallel, the intermediary must also 
inform the copyright owner that the alleged infringer has been contacted. As opposed to what 
is the case under notice-and-takedown, the intermediary’s involvement then reaches its end. 
Once the basic forwarding obligation has been fulfilled, the spotlight instead passes on to the 
true target of the complaint: the alleged primary wrongdoer. In this way, crucially, notice-and-
notice does not leave copyright holders without recourse. The notified party must choose 
whether to remove the content herself or respond to the notification within a limited period of 
time. Naturally, if the parties do not reach a satisfactory outcome among themselves, the 
possibility remains for copyright owners to initiate formal proceedings, after obtaining the end-
user’s identity by means of injunctive orders from the intermediary.114  
 
In this way, notice-and-notice takes a moderate approach to self-regulation, which restricts 
intermediaries to their natural role as middlemen and returns the job of enforcing rights and 
obligations to the courts. It also respects end-users’ privacy and avoids the take-down of lawful 
content that would interfere with their freedom of expression. At the same time, the delivery 
of repeated notices both adds an obstacle for would-be infringers and serves deterrent and 
educational purposes.115 It would thus satisfy the Telekabel dual minimum threshold of 
‘making [copyright infringement]difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet 
users’  from committing it.116  
 
2. Compromise and Defamation: Notice-Wait-and-Takedown 
 
Defamation claims are often challenging to adjudicate, even for courts.117 The difficulty 
multiplies exponentially for intermediaries, especially when they do not have in-house legal 
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expertise. The almost complete lack of European harmonisation of the area clearly does not 
help. As a result, as in the domain of copyright, if a notice-and-takedown regime is imposed in 
the area of defamation, risk-averse intermediaries will be prone to err on the side of caution 
and remove content as soon as they receive a notice. Yet, like claims of copyright infringement, 
claims in this area are not always clear-cut. Indeed, as both Delfi and MTE v Hungary showed, 
adjudicating cases of defamation requires the complicated weighing of the social value of the 
dissemination of ideas against the right of an individual to a good name. The ECtHR rulings 
avoided providing an answer to instances where the relevant claims did not, as in Delfi, also 
amount to hate speech: we are told in MTE that the ex ante filtering demanded by the Hungarian 
courts was excessive, but are given no indication of where the fair balance cut-off might be. 
To enable maximum protection of persons’ reputation, while avoiding the takedown of lawful 
speech by intermediaries anxious to protect their own interests, a system that introduces a 
moment of (judicious, if not judicial) reflection appears most suitable for achieving a viable 
compromise. One mechanism is particularly well-tailored to achieving this aim: notice-wait-
and-takedown. 
 
Notice-wait-and-takedown is a softer interpretation of notice-and-takedown that was pioneered 
in Japan.118 Following this mechanism, intermediaries are required to forward any notice they 
receive of alleged illegality to the content provider and then wait a week before engaging in 
removal or blocking. If the provider either consents or does not respond to the notice, the 
intermediary may proceed with the takedown.119 In this way, the internet user receives the 
opportunity to respond before action is taken. If she fails to convince the intermediary of the 
lawfulness of her speech, the intermediary will feel more secure in taking it down. If, 
conversely, the end-user does defend her speech, the intermediary will be strengthened to resist 
the alleged injured party’s claims. In either scenario, one-sided decisions in favour of the 
alleged victim are substituted by more reflective ones. The system accordingly combines the 
strong points of both notice-and-takedown and notice-and-notice: it limits the instances of 
wrongful takedown of lawful content and gives end-users the opportunity to be heard in the 
process, while also enabling an easier takedown process that does not require a court hearing.  
 
Promisingly, the notice-wait-and-takedown approach is now showing signs of spreading to 
Europe. Section 5 of the UK’s Defamation Act 2013 takes a similar – though much more 
detailed – approach to the Japanese rules, which it applies to website operators.120 Notably, 
while the Japanese approach is horizontal, the UK rules are limited to defamation only. This 
bolsters the argument that notice-wait-and-takedown is particularly suitable for this area of law.  
 
Of course, notice-wait-and-takedown still implies that the quasi-judicial obligations of the 
intermediary, for which notice-and-takedown has been criticised above, remain untouched. 
Interestingly, to counteract this effect, Lithuania implements a slightly modified system. 
Although the time afforded to end-users under Lithuanian law is only three days, once the 
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intermediary has received a response, it may request guidance from the relevant control body, 
before determining whether the justification offered by the end-user is valid.121 
 
3. Compromise and Hate Speech: Notice-and-Takedown & Notice-and-
Suspension  
 
The ‘classic’ notice-and-takedown system, we propose to reserve for cases of hate speech.122 
Arguably, given the greater harm involved and the relative ease with which it can (often) be 
legally established, hate speech should be the object of more robust systems than defamation 
and copyright infringement. Yet, because it is usually not as clear-cut as child pornography, 
we do not consider an automatic takedown obligation suitable for this area. Due consideration 
is instead necessary for the demands on freedom of expression. The balance is a delicate one. 
In particular, we note that due regard for sarcasm, irony and humour, not to mention the 
‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there would be no democratic 
society’,123 makes machine-initiated takedown impossible to successfully implement for hate 
speech.  
 
For these reasons, we posit that notice is necessary in this area. Admittedly, our arguments 
conflict with the position taken by the ECtHR. In Delfi, that Court clearly endorsed stricter 
measures as appropriate for hate speech. We venture to hypothesise that this decision was due 
to a combination of factors: a relative lack of familiarity with notice-and-action systems, a 
misunderstanding of the implications of automatic takedown for other human rights involved124 
and consideration for the margin of appreciation doctrine. Not so burdened, we  submit that – 
on substance – the ECtHR got it wrong. The Court might have been correct in observing, in 
both Delfi and MTE, that combatting hate speech in the online world requires more robust 
protection mechanisms than for defamation. But it went too far with regard to the kinds of 
systems that would achieve a fair balance. Far from applying only to lesser wrongs, notice-
and-takedown should suffice for hate speech, while more lenient systems should be adopted 
for other areas of law.  
 
It should be noted that our position is bolstered by the current state of EU legislation. Indeed, 
as many commentators have noted, both the Delfi and MTE cases rest on a misunderstanding 
by the Estonian and Hungarian courts of the EU’s safe harbour regime. MTE presents a 
particularly egregious example, as the Hungarian legislator appears to have unilaterally and 
arbitrarily limited the reach of the Hungarian implementation of Article 14 ECD to only 
electronic services of a commercial nature, in particular to purchases made via the internet.125 
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The incompatibility of general monitoring with Article 15 ECD and the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU in the Sabam cases also indicates that automatic takedown should not be considered 
possible under a balanced solution.  
 
Confirming our logic, notice-and-takedown has recently been put forth as the correct European 
approach to cases of hate speech by the ‘Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech 
Online’ agreed upon by the European Commission and four major operators of online hosting 
services (Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube).126 Their proposal relies on the 
prohibition, by Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA,127 of instigating, aiding or 
abetting hate speech, acts that will often encompass the knowing or intentional provision of 
intermediary services used for the dissemination of hate speech. From this starting point, the 
Code of Conduct commits the relevant platforms to ‘actions geared at ensuring that illegal hate 
speech online is expeditiously acted upon by online intermediaries and social media platforms, 
upon receipt of a valid notification, in an appropriate timeframe’.128 Admittedly, there is much 
to criticise in the Code, including its problematic co-regulatory nature, the lack of a definition 
of ‘hate speech’ and the lack of a guidelines on what qualifies as a valid notification. 
Nevertheless, the move indicates that notice-and-takedown may well suffice for hate speech in 
the EU arena. 
 
Having said the above, if more protection against hate speech  should be needed than that 
provided by  notice-and-takedown, we  suggest the option of notice-and-suspension as an 
additional avenue. This refers to the banning of the primary perpetrator from the intermediary’s 
platform to disable recidivism. While in this way notice-and-suspension does offer some stay-
down potential, it also manages not to risk disproportionate damage to third party rights. 
Notably, the CJEU suggested the system as a measure that achieves a ‘fair balance’ in L’Oréal. 
Although that particular ruling concerned injunctive orders, the same logic could arguably be 
extended to cases of repeat offenders within the context of notice-based liability-limiting 
regimes – as long, of course, as the threatened harm is sufficiently serious. We suggest that in 
cases of hate speech, it often will be. 
 
4. The All-Purpose Compromise: Notice-and-Judicial-Takedown 
 
A final option to consider is that of notice-and-judicial-takedown. This is perhaps the most 
obvious system of all: the term essentially refers to the rejection of new-fangled self-
regulatory intra-industry solutions in favour of the much more traditional courts-focused 
model. Spain is an example of an EU jurisdiction that favours this approach.129 The system is 
also popular elsewhere (e.g. in Chile).130 Under notice-and-judicial-takedown, the 
complainant must obtain a court order for the removal or blocking of content before the 
intermediary may find itself under an obligation to take action. Sometimes, in the name of 
efficiency, the role of courts is played instead by administrative authorities.  Mere 
notification on the part of the right-holder or a third party is not in itself duty-creating. While 
this model offers optimum guarantees of judicial oversight through the complete 
abandonment of the private litigation model, it has also been criticised for the costs involved, 
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its impractically and the burden it would impose on the court system.131 The disadvantage of 
excessively lengthy and expensive proceedings presents a special challenge, in that they risk 
rendering the benefit to the alleged injured party meaningless. At the same time, we would 
point out that these drawbacks have always applied in the offline world. There, measures 
have been put in place (including summary judgments and temporary injunctions) to 
counteract some of the downsides. There is no reason why these should not be considered 




In its recent Communication, the European Commission stated that ‘self-evidently, there 
cannot be 28 different sets of rules for online platforms in a single market’.133 Yet, with regard 
to intermediary liability, that is precisely the situation in which the EU currently finds itself. 
Beyond the safe harbour provisions of the E-Commerce Directive, very little guidance can be 
found in secondary EU law. How can improved harmonisation be achieved? The highest courts 
of Europe are leading the way forward through the application of fundamental rights law. What 
their case law suggests is the need for solutions that achieve a ‘fair balance’ between the 
different fundamental rights involved. 
 
On this basis, in this article we have argued that the answer to the intermediary liability question 
must be found in the adoption of a vertical system geared to the type of speech at issue. The 
EU’s current horizontal approach – in which the same notice-and-takedown scheme is utilised 
regardless of the type of content – is outdated. Now that the law on intermediary liability is 
entering a staider, more even-keeled age, we propose a move towards a model that provides 
different solutions for different branches of law. For this purpose, we have found inspiration in 
the broad variety of notice-based solutions to intermediary liability emerging on the global 
level. The result is a calibrated system of notice-and-action that aims to achieve a series of 
viable compromises between conflicting fundamental rights in cases of intermediary liability. 
In particular, we have argued that notice-and-notice should suffice for copyright infringement, 
that notice-wait-and-takedown is appropriate for defamation, and that notice-and-takedown, 
potentially in combination with notice-and-suspension, should be reserved for hate speech. We 
have additionally put forth notice-and-judicial-takedown as an all-purpose complementary 
solution that could apply to any area of law. Automatic takedown and notice-and-stay-down, 
finally, should only be considered in cases of child pornography. 
  
Does our approach achieve a true fair balance? We would venture to suggest that it at least 
points in the right direction. Naturally, treating each case on its particular merits would allow 
for even fairer balances that can be tailored to specific circumstances. Yet, excessive flexibility 
can come at the expense of legal certainty. Moreover, the pertinent circumstances surrounding 
instances of illegal content of the same type will often be broadly similar. Of course, if our 
proposed system were to be implemented into EU law, each of the described notice-and-action 
solutions would have to be fleshed out in greater detail by the European legislator. In 
developing these details, the legislator would have to take care to ensure that they further the 
compromise objective: fair balance should not just decide the basic structure of the calibrated 
system, but permeate each of its branches. In any case, we are clear that whatever formula is 
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adopted, it is the legislator who should carry the burden of introducing it, not the intermediary 
through private ordering.  
 
Acknowledging the need for a vertical solution is the first step in shifting the intermediary 
liability debate in the right direction. In a digital world in which anybody can easily disseminate 
content, a constellation of different systems adjusted to the particular stakes raised by different 
types of online wrongdoings arguably offers a good compromise between taking account of 
the individual circumstances of each case and the efficiency of more standardised solutions.  
 
 
